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Abstract. We study strong equilibria in network creation games. These
form a classical and well-studied class of games where a set of players
form a network by buying edges to their neighbors at a cost of a fixed
parameter α. The cost of a player is defined to be the cost of the bought
edges plus the sum of distances to all the players in the resulting graph.
We identify and characterize various structural properties of strong equi-
libria, which lead to a characterization of the set of strong equilibria for
all α in the range (0, 2). For α > 2, Andelman et al. [4] prove that
a star graph in which every leaf buys one edge to the center node is
a strong equilibrium, and conjecture that in fact any star is a strong
equilibrium. We resolve this conjecture in the affirmative. Additionally,
we show that when α is large enough (≥ 2n) there exist non-star trees
that are strong equilibria. For the strong price of anarchy, we provide
precise expressions when α is in the range (0, 2), and we prove a lower
bound of 3/2 when α ≥ 2. Lastly, we aim to characterize under which
conditions (coalitional) improvement dynamics may converge to a strong
equilibrium. To this end, we study the (coalitional) finite improvement
property and (coalitional) weak acyclicity property. We prove various
conditions under which these properties do and do not hold. Some of
these results also hold for the class of pure Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
The Internet is a large-scale network that has emerged mostly from the spon-
taneous, distributed interaction of selfish agents. Understanding the process of
creating of such networks is an interesting scientific problem. Insights into this
process may help to understand and predict how networks emerge, change, and
evolve. This holds in particular for social networks.
The field of game theory has developed a large number of tools and models
to analyze the interaction of many independent agents. The Internet and many
other networks can be argued to have formed through interaction between many
strategic agents. It is therefore natural to use game theory to study the process of
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network formation. Indeed, this has been the subject of study in many research
papers, e.g. [1,2,6,14–16,22], to mention only a few of them.
We focus here on the classical network creation model of [15], which is prob-
ably the class of network formation game that is most prominently studied by
algorithmic game theorists. This model stands out due to its simplicity and ele-
gance: It is simply defined as a game on n players, where each player may choose
an arbitrary set of edges that connects herself to a subset of other players, so
that a graph forms where the vertices are the players. Buying any edge costs
a fixed amount α ∈ R, which is the same for every player. Now, the cost of
a player is defined as the total cost of set of edges she bought, plus the sum
of distances to all the other players in the graph. A network creation game is
therefore determined by two parameters: α and n.
Another reason for why these network creation games are an ineresting topic
of study, are the surprisingly challenging questions that emerge from this simple
class of games. For example, it is (as of writing) unknown whether the price of
anarchy of these network creation games is bounded by a constant, where the
term price of anarchy is defined as the factor by which the total cost of a pure
Nash equilibrium is away from the minimum possible total cost [20,21].
In the present work, we study strong equilibria, which are a refinement of
the pure Nash equilibrium solution concept. Strong equilibria are defined as
pure Nash equilibria that are resilient against strategy changes that are made
collectively by arbitrary sets of players, in addition to strategy changes that are
made by individual players (see [5]). Generally, such an equilibrium may not
exist, since this is already the case for pure Nash equilibria. On the other hand,
in case they do exist, then strong equilibria are extremely robust, and they are
likely to describe the final outcome of a game in case they are, in a realistic
sense, “easy to attain” for the players. Fortunately, as [4] points out, in network
creation games, strong equilibria are guaranteed to exist except in a very limited
number of cases. The combination of the facts that strong equilibria are robust,
and are almost always guaranteed to exist, calls for a detailed study of these
equilibria in network creation games, which is what we do in the present work.
We provide in this paper a complete characterization of the set of all strong
equilibria for α ∈ (0, 2). Moreover, for α > 2 we prove in the affirmative the
conjecture of [4] that any strategy profile that forms a star graph (i.e., a tree of
depth 1) is a strong equilibrium. We also show that for large enough α (namely,
for α ≥ 2n), there exist strong equilibria that result in trees that are not stars.
The price of anarchy restricted to strong equilibria is called the strong price of
anarchy. This notion was introduced in [4], where also the strong price of anarchy
of network creation games was studied first. The authors prove there that the
strong price of anarchy is at most 2. We contribute to the understanding of the
strong price of anarchy by providing a sequence of examples of strong equilibria
where the strong price of anarchy converges to 3/2, thereby providing the first
non-trivial lower bound (to the best of our knowledge).
Regarding the reachability and the likelihood for the players to actually attain
a strong equilibrium, we study the question whether they can be reached by
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response dynamics, i.e., the process where we start from any strategy profile,
and we repeatedly let a player or a set of players make a change of strategies
that is beneficial for each player in the set, i.e., decreases their cost. In particular,
we are interested in whether network creation games posess the coalitional finite
improvement property (that is: whether such response dynamics are guaranteed
to result in a strong equilibrium), and the coalitional weak acyclicity property
(that is: whether there exists a sequence of coalitional strategy changes that
ends in a strong equilibrium when starting from any strategy profile). We prove
various conditions under which these properties are satisfied. Roughly, we show
that coalitional weak acyclicity holds when α ∈ (0, 1] or when starting from
a strategy profile that forms a tree (for α ∈ (0, n/2]), but that the coalitional
finite improvement property is unfortunately not satisfied for any α. Some of
these results hold for pure Nash equilibria as well.
1.1 Our Contributions
A key publication that is strongly related to our work is [4], where the authors
study the existence of strong equilibria in network creation games. The authors
prove that the strong price of anarchy of network creation games does not exceed
2 and provide insights into the structure and existence of strong equilibria. This is
to the best of our knowledge the only paper studying strong equilibria in network
creation games. Let us therefore summarize how the present paper complements
and contributes to the results in [4]: First, we provide additional results on
the strong equilibrium structure, such that together with the results from [4] we
obtain a characterization of strong equilibria for α ∈ (0, 2). Furthermore, in [4] it
was conjectured that all strategy profiles that form a star (and such that no edge
is bought by two players at the same time) are strong equilibria. We answer this
conjecture positively. Because [4] does not provide examples of strong equilibria
that are not stars (for α > 2), this may suggest the conjecture that all strong
equilibria form a star for α > 2. We show however that the latter is not true: We
provide a family of examples of strong equilibria which form trees of diameter
four (hence, not stars). More interestingly, the latter sequence of examples has a
price of anarchy that converges to 3/2, thereby providing (again, to the best of
our knowledge) the first non-trivial lower bound on the strong price of anarchy.
Related to this set of results, we want to mention the following interesting open
questions for future research: (i) What is the exact strong price of anarchy of the
class of network creation games? Our work shows that it must lie in the interval
[3/2, 2]. (ii) Does there exist a non-star strong equilibrium for α ∈ (2, 2n)? (iii)
Do there exist strong equilibria that form trees of arbitrarily high diameter, and
do there exist strong equilibria that are not trees?
A second theme of our paper is to investigate under which circumstances
the coalitional finite improvement and coalitional weak acyclicity properties are
satisfied, as satisfying those properties contribute to the credibility of strong
equilibria as a realistic solution concept. We show to this end that coalitional
weak acyclicity always holds for α ∈ (0, 1] and holds for α ∈ (1, n/2) in case the
starting strategy profile is a tree. We prove on the negative side that for all α
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there exists a number of players n such that the coalitional finite improvement
property does not hold. The only special case for which we manage to estab-
lish existence of the coalitional finite improvement property is for n = 3 and
α > 1. With regard to convergence of response dynamics to strong equilibria, an
interesting question that we leave open is whether the coalitional weak acyclicity
property holds for α > n/2, and for α ∈ (1, n/2) when starting at non-tree strat-
egy profiles. We will see throughout that some of our results on these properties
also hold for the set of pure Nash equilibria.
An overview of results is summarized in the tables below. Table 1 provides an
overview for our characterization and structure theorems for strong equilibria,
Table 2 shows our bounds on the strong price of anarchy, and Table 3 shows
our results on the finite improvement and weak acyclicity properties of network
creation games. Due to space constraints, the proofs of many of our results have
been omitted and will be published in a full version of the paper.
Table 1. Overview of strong equilibria characterization results and structural results.
α ∈ (0, 1) α = 1 α ∈ (1, 2) α ≥ 2
Strong
equilibria
Characterized
(in [4])
Characterized
(Theorem 1)
Characterized
(Proposition 1)
Every star is a strong
equilibrium
(Theorem 2),
existence of non-star
strong equilibria
(Theorem 3)
Table 2. Overview of bounds on the strong price of anarchy.
α ∈ (0, 1) α = 1 α ∈ (1, 2) α ≥ 2
Strong
price of
anarchy
1 (Trivial) 10/9 if n ≤ 4
and (3n +2)/3n
if n ≥ 5
(Theorem 4)
(2α+8)/(3α+6)
if n = 3, and
(4α +16)/(6α +
12) if n = 4
(Proposition 3)
At least 3/2
(Theorem 5) and at
most 2 [4]
Table 3. Summary of results on the c-FIP and c-weak acyclicity of network creation
games.
α ∈ (0, 1) α = 1 α ∈ (1, 2) α = 2 α > 2
c-FIP Negative
(Lemma 6)
Negative
(Lemma 6)
Negative
(Lemma 6)
Negative
(Lemma 6)
Negative (in
[9])
Positive for n = 3 (Lemma 4)
c-weak
acyclicity
Positive
(Corollary of
Lemma 8)
Positive
(Proposition 9)
Positive with respect to trees for α ∈ (1, n/2)
(Lemma 11)
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2 Related Literature
We discussed already extensively the works [4,15]. The latter is the article in
which network creation games were first defined. Moreover, [15] conjectured that
there exists an A ∈ R≥0 such that all non-transient equilibria (where transience
stands for a particular notion of instability) are trees for α ≥ A.
This conjecture was subsequently disproved by [1], where the authors con-
struct non-tree equilibria for abitrarily high α. These equilbiria are strict (i.e.,
for no player there is a deviation that keeps her cost unchanged) and therefore
non-transient, and their construction uses finite affine planes. In this paper, the
authors moreover show that the price of anarchy is constant for α ≤ √n and
for α ≥ 12n log n, as for the second case they prove that any pure equilibrium
is a tree. In [27], the latter bound was improved, as it was shown there that for
α ≥ 273n all pure equilibria are trees. Later on, in [24], this was further improved
by showing that it even holds for α ≥ 65n. Very recently, in [3], further progress
has been made in this direction by showing that every pure Nash equilibrium
is a tree already when α > 17n, and that the price of anarchy is bounded by
a constant for α > 9n. In [12], some constant bounds on the price of anarchy
were improved, and it was shown that for α ≤ n1− the price of anarchy is con-
stant, for all  ≥ 0. It remains an open question whether the price of anarchy is
constant for all α ∈ R≥0. In particular, the best known bound on the price of
anarchy for α ∈ [n1−, 9n] is 2O(
√
logn), shown in [12]. For all other choices of α
the price of anarchy is known to be constant. The master’s thesis [25] provides
some simplified proofs for some of the above facts, and proves that if an equi-
librium graph has bounded degree, then the price of anarchy is bounded by a
constant. It also studies some related computational questions.
Many other variants of network creation games have been considered as well.
A version where disconnected players incur a finite cost rather than an infinite
one was studied in [9]. In [1], a version is introduced where the distance cost of
a player i to another player j is weighted by some number wij . A special case of
this weighted model was proposed in [26]. The paper [12] introduces a version of
the game where the distance cost of a player is defined the maximum distance
from i to any other player (instead of the sum of distances), and studies the
price of anarchy for these games. Further results on those games can be found in
[27]. Another natural variant of a cost sharing game is one where both endpoints
of an edge can contribute to its creation, as proposed in [26], or must share its
creation cost equally as proposed in [11] and further investigated in [12]. In [6], a
version of the game is studied where the edges are directed, and the distance of
a player i to another player j is the minimum length of a directed path from i to
j. The literature on these games and generalizations thereof (see e.g., [8,13,14])
concerns existence of equilibria and the properties of response dynamics. See
[7,16–18] for another undirected network creation model and properties of pure
equilibria in those models. Further, in the very recent paper [10], a variant of
network creation games is studied where the cost of buying an edge to a player
is proportional to the number of neighbors of that player.
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In [2], the authors analyze the outcomes of the game under the assumption
that the players consider deviations by swapping adjacent edges. Better response
dynamics under this assumption have been studied in [22]. A modified version
of this model is introduced in [26], where players can only swap their own edges.
The authors prove some structural results on the pure equilibria that can then
arise. Furthermore, in [23] the deviation space is enriched by allowing the players
to add edges, and various price of anarchy type bounds are established under
this assumption. In [19], the dynamics of play in various versions of network
creation games are further investigated.
3 Preliminaries
A network creation game Γ is a game played by n ≥ 3 players where the strategy
set of Si of a player i ∈ [n] = {1, . . . , n} is given by Si = {s : s ⊆ [n] \ {i}}.
That is, each player chooses a subset of other players. Let S = ×i∈[n]Si be the
strategy profiles of Γ and for a subset K ⊆ [n] of players let SK = ×i∈KSi. Given
a strategy profile s ∈ S, we define G(s) as the undirected graph with vertex set
[n] and edge set {{i, j} : j ∈ si ∨ i ∈ sj}. For a graph G on vertex set [n], we
denote by dG(i, j) the length of the shortest path from i to j in G (and we define
the distance between two disconnected vertices as infinity).
The cost of player i under s is given by ci(s) = cbi (si)+ c
d
i (s), where c
b
i (si) =
α|si| is referred to as the building cost, α ∈ R≥0 is a player-independent constant,
and cdi (s) =
∑n
j=1 dG(s)(i, j) is referred to as the distance cost. The interpretation
given to this game is that the players buy edges to other players and that creates
a network. Buying a single edge costs α. The shortest distance dG(s)(i, j) to each
other player j is furthermore added to the cost of a player i. We denote a network
creation game by the pair (n, α)
For a strategy profile s ∈ S let d(s) = ∑i cdi (s). The social cost of strategy
profile s, denoted C(s), is defined as the sum of all individual costs: C(s) =∑
i∈[n] ci(s) = α
∑
i |si| + d(s).
We study the strong equilibria of this game. A strong equilibrium of an n-
player cost minimization game Γ with strategy profile set S = ×ni=1Si is an s ∈ S
such that for all K ⊆ [n] and for all s′K ∈ SK there exists a player i ∈ K such
that, ci(s) ≤ ci(s′K , s−K), where ci is the cost function of player i and (s′K , s−K)
denotes the vector obtained from s by replacing the |K| elements at index set K
with the elements s′K . (A pure Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile that satisfies
the latter condition only for singleton K.) Strong equilibria are guaranteed to
exist in almost all network creation games, as we will explain later.
We are interested in determining the strong price of anarchy [4]. The
strong price of anarchy of a network creation game Γ is the ratio PoA(Γ) =
max{C(s)/C(s∗) : s ∈ SE}, where s∗ is a social optimum, i.e., a strategy profile
that minimizes the social cost. Furthermore SE is the set of strong equilibria of
the game.
A strategy profile s is called rational if there is no player pair i, j ∈ [n] such
that j ∈ si and i ∈ sj . It is clear that all pure Nash equilibria (and thus all
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strong equilibria) of any network creation game are rational, as are all the social
optima. When s is a rational strategy profile, the social cost can be written as
C(s) = α|E(G(s))| + d(s), where E(G(s)) denotes the edge set of the graph
G(s).
We write degG(s)(i) to denote the degree of player i in graph G(s), and we
denote by diam(G(s))) the diameter of G(s). We define the free-riding function
f : S × [n] → N by the formula f(s, i) = degG(s)(i) − |si|. For any strategy
profile s ∈ S we have the following lower bound for the cost of player i,
ci(s) ≥ 2n − 2 − degG(s)(i) + |si|α = 2n − 2 − f(s, i) + |si|(α − 1). (1)
Moreover, we see that in case s is rational,
∑
i∈[n]
|si| = |E| =
∑
i∈[n]
f(s, i). (2)
Graph theory notions. We define an n-star to be a tree of n vertices with diam-
eter 2, i.e., it is a tree where one vertex is connected to all other vertices. It
is straightforward to verify that (1) is tight when G(s) is an n-star, and (more
generally) when G(s) has diameter at most 2. We denote by Kn the complete
undirected graph on vertex set [n]. We denote by Cn the undirected cycle on
vertex set [n]. We denote by Pn the undirected path on vertex set [n]. Lastly,
we define a centroid vertex of a tree T = (V,E) as a vertex v ∈ V that min-
imizes max{|Vi| : (Vi, Ei) ∈ CT−v}, where CT−v denotes the set of connected
components of the subgraph of T induced by V \ {v}.
Coalitional improvement dynamics. A sequence of strategy profiles (s1, s2, . . .)
is called a path if for every k > 1 there exists a player i ∈ [n] such that sk =
(s′i, s
k−1
−i ). We call a path an improvement path if it is maximal and for all k > 1
holds ci(sk) < ci(sk−1) where i is the player who deviated from sk−1. We say
that it is an improvement cycle if additionally there exists a constant T such
that sk+T = sk for all k ≥ 1. A sequence of strategies (s1, s2, . . .) is called a best
response improvement path if for all k > 1 and all i such that ski 	= sk−1i we have
ci(sk) < ci(sk−1) and there is no s′i ∈ Si such that ci(s′i, sk−i) < ci(sk) (that is:
ski is a best response to s
k−1
−i ). A sequence of strategies (s
1, s2, . . .) is called a
coalitional improvement path if for all k > 1 and all i such that ski 	= sk−1i we
have ci(sk) < ci(sk−1).
A game has the (coalitional) finite improvement property ((c-)FIP) if every
(coalitional) improvement path is finite. A game has finite best response property
(FBRP) if every best response improvement path is finite. We call a game (c-)
weakly acyclic if for every s ∈ S there exists a finite (coalitional) improvement
path starting from s. Lastly, we call a network creation game (c-)weakly acyclic
with respect to a class of graphs G if for every s ∈ S such that G(s) ∈ G, there
exists a (coalitional) finite improvement path starting from s.
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4 Structural Properties of Strong Equilibria
We provide in this section various results that imply a full characterization of
strong equilibria for α ∈ (0, 2), and we resolve a conjecture of [4] by showing
that any rational strategy s ∈ S such that G(s) is a star is a strong equilibrium
for all α ≥ 2. Moreover, we give a family of examples of strategy profiles that
form trees of diameter 4 (hence do not form stars) and are strong equilibria
when α ≥ 2n. First, for α ∈ (0, 1) the strong equilibrium set is straighforward to
derive, as has been pointed out in [4]: in this case a strategy profile is a strong
equilibrium if and only if it is rational and forms the complete graph. It is easy
to see that this characterization also holds for the set of Nash equilibria.
For α = 1, the situation is more complex. First, we can show that the fol-
lowing lemma holds for all α < 2.
Lemma 1. Fix α < 2 and suppose that s ∈ S is a strong equilibrium. For each
sequence of players (i0, i1, . . . , ik = i0) such that k ≥ 3 in G(s) there exists an
t ∈ {0, . . . , k−1} such that (it, it+1) ∈ E(G(s)). In other words, the complement
of G(s) is a forest.
Therefore, if α < 2 and s ∈ S is a strong equilibrium, then there is no
independent set of size 3 in G(s). Also, if α < 2 and |V | ≥ 4, then a strategy
profile s ∈ S, such that G(s) is a star is not a strong equilibrium. Since when
α ∈ [1, 2), a rational strategy profile that forms a star is a Nash equilibrium, this
implies that the pure Nash equilibria and strong equilibria do not coincide.
In order to characterize the strong equilibria for α = 1, we first provide a
characterization of the pure Nash equilibria.
Lemma 2. For α = 1, a strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if and only
if s is rational and G(s) has diameter at most 2.
The following theorem then characterizes the set of strong equilibria for α = 1.
Theorem 1. For α = 1, a strategy profile s ∈ S is a strong equilibrium if and
only if s is rational, G(s) has diameter at most 2, and the complement of G(s)
is a forest.
For α ∈ (1, 2), it was shown in [4] that strong equilibria do not exist for
n ≥ 5. It can be shown that for n = 3 the set of strong equilibria are the rational
strategy profiles that form the 3-star. (Hence, all pure Nash equilibria are strong
equilibria in this case). For n = 4 we observe that the only strong equilibria are
those that form the cycle on 4 vertices such that every player buys exactly one
edge. Thus, the following proposition completes our characterization of strong
equilibria for α ∈ (1, 2).
Proposition 1. Let α ∈ (1, 2) and let s ∈ S. Then: (i) If n = 3, strategy profile
s is a strong equilibrium if and only if s is rational and G(s) is a 3-star. (ii)
If n = 4, strategy profile s is a strong equilibrium if and only if s is rational,
|si| = 1 for all i, and G(s) is a cycle. (iii) If n ≥ 5, s is not a strong equilibrium.
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Next, we prove the following conjecture of [4].
Theorem 2. Let α ≥ 2 and s ∈ S. If s is rational and G(s) is a star, then s is
a strong equilibrium.
The proof of this theorem relies on two lemmas. The first lemma provide
bounds on the free-riding function of player sets who manage to deviate prof-
itably, while the second lemma bounds the change in the free-riding function for
players who do not deviate.
Lemma 3. Let α ≥ 2 let s ∈ S be a rational strategy profile such that G(s) is
a star. Let K ⊆ [n] be a set of players and let s′ = (s′K , s−K) be a profitable
deviation for K, i.e., for all i ∈ K, it holds that ci(s′K , s−K) < ci(s). Then
for every i ∈ K such that degG(s)(i) = 1 it holds that f(s′, i) > f(s, i) and
f(s′, i) − f(s, i) ≥ |s′i| − |si| + 1.
Lemma 4. Let α ≥ 2 and let s ∈ S be a rational strategy profile such that
G(s) is a star. Let K ⊆ [n] be a player set and s′ = (s′K , s−K) be a strategy
profile that decreases the costs of all members of K. Then
∑
j∈[n]\K f(s
′, j) −
f(s, j) > −|K|. Moreover, if K contains a vertex i such that degG(s)(i) > 1 then∑
j∈[n]\K f(s
′, j) − f(s, j) ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let s ∈ S be a strategy profile that is rational such that
G(s) is a star. It is easy to see that s is a Nash equilibrium (see also [15]). Suppose
that K ∈ [n] and s′ ∈ SK are such that strategy profile s′ = (s′K , s−K) decreases
the costs of all players in K. Let k = |K|, we have two cases to consider.
If degG(s)(i) = 1 for all i ∈ K, then
∑
i∈K(f(s
′, i) − f(s, i)) ≥ k +∑
i∈K(|s′i|−|si|) = k+
∑
i∈[n](|s′i|−|si|) = k+
∑
i∈[n](f(s
′, i)−f(s, i)), where the
inequality follows from Lemma 3 and the last equality follows from (2). Hence∑
i∈[n]\K f(s
′, i) − f(s, i) ≤ −k, which is the contradiction with Lemma 4.
If K contains the center vertex i (i.e., the vertex for which degG(s)(i) > 1),
then
∑
j∈K\{i}(f(s
′, j) − f(s, j)) ≥ (k − 1) + ∑j∈K\{i}(|s′j | − |sj |) = (k − 1) +∑
j∈[n](|s′j |−|sj |)−(|s′i|−|si|) = (k−1)+
∑
j∈[n] (f(s
′, j) − f(s, j))−(|s′i|−|si|),
where again the inequality follows from Lemma 3 and the last equality follows
from (2).
Since i is a central vertex, we have cdi (s
′) ≥ cdi (s). Moreover, i ∈ K, hence
ci(s′) < ci(s). This implies that cbi (s
′) < cbi (s) or equivalently |s′i| < |si|. So∑
j∈K\{i}(f(s
′, j)−f(s, j)) ≥ k+∑j∈[n](f(s′, j)−f(s, j)). Thus: −k ≥
∑
j∈[n]\K
(f(s′, j)−f(s, j))+(f(s′, i)−f(s, i)) ≥ f(s′, i)−f(s, i), where the last inequality
follows from Lemma 4. On the other hand we have f(s′, i) − f(s, i) ≥ −(k − 1),
since the change from s to s′ could have removed at most k − 1 edges going to
player i, which is a contradiction.
Next, for α > 2, we present a family of strong equilibria none of which forms
a star. The graphs resulting from these strong equilibria are trees of diameter 4.
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Example 1. Our examples are paramatrized by two values A ∈ N, A ≥ 4 and
k ∈ N. Let α ≥ 2n, and let n = Ak + 2. In the following strategy profile s the
only players who buy edges are 1, . . . , A−1 and n, i.e., for all i ∈ [n], A ≤ i < n,
it holds that si = ∅. We denote player n by R. The total number of edges
bought by players {1, . . . , A − 1, R} is n − 1 = Ak + 1 such that G(s) is a tree.
L1 = {A,A + 1, . . . , (A − 1)k} and L2 = {(A − 1)k + 1, . . . , n − 1} denote the
remaining k + 1 players who do not buy edges. The strategy sets are defined as
follows: Player R buys edges to L2. Each player in [A− 1] buys an edge to k − 1
players of L1 in such a way that the degree in G(s) equals 1 for every player in
L1. Moreover, each player in [A − 1] buys an edge to R. Thus, each player in
{1, . . . , A − 1} buys k edges, R buys k + 1 edges, and all the remaining players
(i.e., in L1 and L2) buy no edges and are leaves in G(s). Figure 1 depicts this
strategy profile.
Fig. 1. Depiction of the graph G(s) formed by the strong equilibrium s. The graph
G(s) is a is a tree of diameter 4. Strategy profile s is a strong equilibrium for α ≥ 2n
and n = A·k+2 where A ∈ N, A ≥ 4 is the number of players that buy edges and k ∈ N.
One player (called R) buys k + 1 edges to leaves. The remaining A − 1 players (that
buy edges) each buy k − 1 edges to leaves and one edge to R. In the depicted instance
of the example we have: A = 5, k = 4, L1 = {5, 6, . . . , 16}, L2 = {17, 18, . . . , 21} and
the set of players buying edges is {1, . . . , 4} ∪ {R}.
Despite that s is relatively easy to define, establishing that s is a strong
equilibrium is challenging.
Theorem 3. If α ≥ 2n, strategy profile s forms a (non-star) tree and is a strong
equilibrium.
Proof. In s, there are four different types of node: The root R, the players
1 . . . , A − 1, the leaves L1, and the leaves L2. The distance costs for each of
these types are as follows.
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cdi (s) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
2n − A − k − 2 if i = R (3a)
3n − A − 3k − 2 if i ∈ [A − 1] (3b)
3n − A − k − 4 if i ∈ L2 (3c)
4n − A − 3k − 4 if i ∈ L1 (3d)
Proposition 2. Let s ∈ S. For all i ∈ [n], cdi (s) ≥= 2n − 2 − degG(s)(i).
To show that s is a strong equilibrium, suppose for contradiction that K ⊆ [n]
and s′K ∈ SK are such that in s′ = (s′K , s−K) it holds that ci(s′) < ci(s) for all
i ∈ K. Under this assumption, using (3a − 3d), we show that no player in K
buys more edges under s′ than it does under s.
Lemma 5. For all i ∈ K, it holds that |s′i| ≤ |si|.
The proofs of this lemma and the following lemma are omitted. Since G(s)
is a tree, it has the minimum number of edges among all connected graphs.
Combining this with the lemma above yields that every player buys in s′ exactly
as many edges as in s.
Corollary 1. Graph G(s′) is a tree, and for all i ∈ [n], it holds that |s′i| = |si|.
Lemma 6. Player R is not in K.
Denote by LK = {j ∈ L1 | ∃i ∈ K : j ∈ si} the leaves in L1 that are directly
connected to a player in K in G(s). Let CR be the players in the connected
component of G(∅, s−K) containing R. Let i ∈ argi′ max{dG(s′)(i′, CR) : i′ ∈ K}
be a player in K that has the highest distance to CR among all players in K.
Lemma 7. The distance dG(s′)(i, CR) of i to CR in G(s′) is as least 2.
In s, the distance from i to CR is 1. As CR contains at least k + 2 vertices,
by deviating from s to s′ the distance increase of player i to CR is at least k+1.
We complete the proof of Theorem 3 by showing that by deviating from s to s′,
the distance decrease of player i to the players of [n] \CR does not exceed k +1.
This is sufficient, as it implies that ci(s′) ≥ ci(s) which contradicts that i ∈ K.
To see this, observe that in G(s) player i has in his neighborhood at most one
player in K. If in G(s′) there are two or more players in K in i’s neighborhood,
then one of them is further away from CR than i (contradicting the definition
of i), or there is a cycle in G(s′) (contradicting Corollary 1). Let us separately
compute the distance improvement to nodes in LK and to nodes in K:
– In G(s), the distance from i to all |K| − 1 players in K is 2. In G(s′) the
distance from i to at most one player in K is 1, while at least K − 2 player
are at distance 2 from i. Therefore, the total decrease in distance from i to
players in K is at most 1.
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– In G(s), there are k−1 players of LK at distance 1 from i, and the remaining
|LK |−k+1 players of LK are at distance 3 from i. In G(s′) there are at most
k players at distance 1 from i, there are at most k − 1 players at distance 2
from i (since the unique player i′ of K that is directly connected to i (and
buys the edge (i′, i)) has at most k − 1 connections to LK). Hence at least
|LK | − 2k + 1 players of LK are at distance 3 from i. Therefore, the total
decrease in distance from i to players in LK is at most (k − 1) + (3|LK | −
3k + 3) − k − (2k − 2) − (3|LK | − 6k + 3) = k + 1.
It follows that by deviating from s to s′, the maximum possible distance improve-
ment for i to players in [n] \ CR is k + 2, while the distance to at least k + 2
vertices of CR increases by 1. As |s′i| = |si| by Corollary 1, the building cost
of i is not affected by the deviation, so the deviation is not profitable for i; a
contradiction.
5 Bounds on the Strong Price of Anarchy
In this section we analyze the strong price of anarchy of network creation games.
First, for α < 2, we provide exact expressions on the strong price of anarchy using
the various insights of Sect. 4. Subsequently, for higher values of α, we provide
a sequence of examples that converges to a price of anarchy of 3/2. This shows
that the strong price of anarchy of the complete class of network creation games
must lie in the interval [3/2, 2], due to the upper bound of 2 established in [4]. It
is trivial that for α ∈ (0, 1), the strong price of anarchy is 1. This holds because
any rational strategy profile that forms the complete graph minimizes the social
cost. The picture turns out to be relatively complex for α = 1.
Theorem 4. For α = 1, the strong price of anarchy is 10/9 if n ∈ {3, 4}, and
the strong price of anarchy is (3n + 2)/3n if n ≥ 5.
Proof. By Theorem 1, for α = 1 a strategy profile s is a strong equilibrium
always if and only if it is rational and forms a graph of diameter at most 2 that
is the complement of a forest. This means that vertices connected by an edge
are distance 1 apart, and vertices not connected by an edge are distance 2 apart.
A forest F has at most n−1 edges, so we obtain the following bound on the social
cost of a strong equilibrium: α(n(n − 1)/2− |F |) + 2(2|F |+ n(n − 1)/2− |F |) =
3n(n − 1)/2 + |F | ≤ 3n(n − 1)/2 + (n − 1). This bound is achieved for n ≥ 5
by taking for F any Hamiltonian path. Thus for α = 1 and n ≥ 5, given that
the social optimum forms a complete graph, we obtain that the strong price of
anarchy is (3n(n−1)/2+(n−1))/(3n(n−1)/2) = (3n(n−1)+2(n−1))(3n(n−
1)) = 3n+2/3n. For n = 4, the maximum size forest (such that the complement
of it has diameter 2) has only 2 edges, and for n = 3 it has only 1 edge. Therefore,
the strong price of anarchy for α = 1 and n ∈ {3, 4} equals 10/9.
For α ∈ (1, 2), there exists no strong equilibrium if n ≥ 5 (see [4]). Therefore,
it remains to derive the strong equilibria for α ∈ (1, 2) and n ∈ {3, 4}.
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Proposition 3. For α ∈ (1, 2) the strong price of anarchy is (2α + 8)/(3α + 6)
if n = 3, and the strong price of anarchy is (4α + 16)/(6α + 12) if n = 4.
For α > 2 it seems very challenging to prove precise bounds on the strong
price of anarchy. However, it is known that for α ≥ 2 the strong price of anarchy
is at most 2 [4]. We now complement this bound by showing that for Example 1
(given in Sect. 4), the strong price of anarchy is at least 3/2.
Theorem 5. The price of anarchy of network creation games is at least 3/2.
Proof. Let x ≥ 4 and consider the strong equilibrium s given in Example 1,
for α = 2n and k = A = x. The players in L1 each have a distance cost of
4n−4−A−3k = 4x2+4−x−3x. Since |L1| = (A−1)(k−1) = x2−2x+1 the total
distance cost of s is at least 4x4−12x3+16x2−12x+4. Moreover, G(s) is a tree,
so the total building cost of s equals (n−1)α = (Ak+1)2(Ak+2) = 2x4+6x2+4.
Therefore, the social cost of s satisfies C(s) ≥ 6x4 − 12x3 + 22x2 − 12x + 4.
For α ≥ 2, the social optimum forms an n-star. Thus, the optimal social cost
is (n − 1)α + 2(n − 1)2 = 2n(n − 1) + 2(n − 1)2 ≤ 4n(n − 1) = 4x4 + 12x2 + 8
Combining these two bounds and taking x to infinity, we obtain that the strong
price of anarchy is at least limx→∞(6x4−12x3+22x2−12x+4)/(4x4+12x2+8) =
3/2.
6 Convergence of Coalitional Improvement Dynamics
In this section we study the c-FIP and coalitional weak acyclicity of network
creation games. On the positive side, c-weak acyclicity holds for α ∈ (0, 2)1 and
for all α ≤ n/2 in case the starting strategy profile forms a tree. On the other
hand, our negative results encompass that the c-FIP is not satisfied for any α.2
First, running best response dynamics on a network creation game ends up in a
pure Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 8. For α < 1, every network creation game has the FBRP.
From Lemma 8 and the fact that Nash equilibria and strong equilibria coin-
cide for α < 1 (as we also pointed out in Sect. 4), we obtain as a corollary that
for α < 1, every network creation game is c-weakly acyclic. For α = 1 we can
also show weak acyclicity and c-weak acyclicity.
Lemma 9. For α = 1, every network creation game is weakly acyclic and c-
weakly acyclic.
We may also prove that for α ∈ (1, 2) and n ∈ {3, 4}, network creation games
are c-weakly acyclic. (Recall that for α ∈ (1, 2) and n ≥ 5, strong equilibria do
not exist.)
1 Except for α ∈ (1, 2) and n ≥ 5, in which case we know that strong equilibria do not
exist.
2 An exception to this is that we can prove that the coalitional finite improvement
property is satisfied for the very special case that α > 1 and n = 3.
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Proposition 4. For α > 1 and n = 3 network creation games have the c-FIP.
For α ∈ (1, 2) and n = 4, network creation games are c-weakly acyclic.
For α ≤ n/2 we can show that c-weak acyclicity is satisfied as long as our
starting strategy profile forms a tree. This result relies on the following lemma
about centroid vertices of trees.
Lemma 10. Let T = (V,E) be a tree, and let v ∈ V be a centroid vertex of T .
It holds that max{|Vi| : (Vi, Ei) ∈ CT−v} ≤ (1/2)|V |.
Lemma 11. For α ∈ (1, n/2), let s ∈ S be such that G(s) is a tree. Then
there exists an improvement path resulting in a strong equilibrium. Hence, every
network creation game is weakly acyclic and c-weakly acyclic with respect to
trees.
Proof. Let s ∈ S and suppose G(s) is a tree. Let v ∈ [n] be a centroid vertex of
G(s). Consider the following sequence of deviations. If there is a player i such
that dG(s)(i, v) ≥ 2, then s′i = si ∪ {v} and s′ = (s′i, s−i). Repeat this step
with s = s′ until dG(s)(i, v) = 1 for all i ∈ V \ {v}. Observe that since v is
a centroid vertex of G(s), by Lemma 10, player i decreases the distance to at
least n/2 players by at least 1 by buying an edge to v. This exceeds the cost
of α, hence this deviation is profitable. Otherwise, if there is no player i such
that dG(s)(i, v) ≥ 2, and G(s) is not a star, then there are players i, j ∈ [n] such
that i 	= v, j 	= v and j ∈ si, then let s′i = si \ {j}. Repeat this step until G(s)
is a star. Observe that player i is better off by the strategy change. She saves
α > 1 in her building cost and her distance cost increases by only 1, since for
each player not in i’s neighborhood there is a shortest path through v. Hence
the only loss is the distance increase between i and j. If s is rational after this
sequence of deviations, then we have reached a strong equilibrium by Theorem 2.
Otherwise there are i, j such that i ∈ sj and j ∈ si. We set s′i = si \ {j} and
repeat this step until we reach a rational s.
However, we may show that in general, network creation games do not have
the c-FIP, regardless of the choice of α.
Theorem 6. For every α there exists a number of players n such that network
creation game (n, α) does not have the c-FIP.
This above theorem is proved by providing examples for α < 1, α = 1, α ∈
(1, 2), and α = 2 separately. For α > 2, the example in Theorem 1 of [9] implies
that network creation games are not potential games. Hence they do not possess
the FIP and the c-FIP for this range of α.
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